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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTIONS 7 & 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was involved in an automobile 
accident in North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah, 
on the 14th day of November, 1959; and as a result 
of said accident, Floyd James was critica'lly injured 
and died a few hours later in a Salt Lake Hospital. 
During the same evening defendant was arrested 
and 'taken to a Justice of the Peace, E. S. Arbuckle, 
who issued a commitment lodging the defendant in 
the Davis County Jail, on a charge of drunk driving. 
On the 17th day of November, 1959, a complaint 
was filed against the defendant, charging him wi'th 
the crime of automobile homicide, in violation of 
Section 76-30-7.4 Utah Code Annotated (1953), to 
which charge a plea of "not guilty" was entered; 
and preliminary hearing was set for December 16, 
1959. Following the preliminary hearing, the de-
fendant was bound over to stand trial in the District 
Court of Davis County. 
The information upon which the defendant was 
charged read in part as fo'llows: 
"That the defendant, Paul L. Nelson, 
while under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor, did willfully, unlawfully, and fellonious-
ly drive an automobile in a reckless and neg-
ligent manner upon U. S. Highway 91 in 
North Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah, 
and did collide with an automobile driven by 
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Floyd James, resulting in the death of the 
said Floyd James." 
A trial on the issues was held before the Hon-
ol·able Charles D. Cowley on Wednesday, April 20 
and 21, 1960, following which a jury returned a 
vel'dict of Guilty as Charged in 'the Information. 
The defendant appealed to this Court. 
Since the proceedings and conduct of the State's 
Officers during the investigation is questioned, a 
rather detailed examination of the transcript wil11 
follow. 
The evidence shows that on November 14, 1959, 
a't approximately 7:45 P.M., the defendant was pro-
ceeding north on Highway 91. As he approached the 
semaphore-controlled intersection of Highway 91 
with Cudahy Lane, which lane intersects Highway 
91 in an east-westerly direction (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit P), a 1950 Dodge automobile, owned and 
operated by a Mr. William Jackson, was in the pro-
cess of making a left turn from Cudahy Lane, wes't-
erly and south onto Highway 91. The defendant's 
automobile struck the left rear of the Jackson auto-
mobile and then proceeded through the intersection 
and co'llided with a Chevrolet automobile driven by 
the deceased, Floyd James, as the James automobile 
was attempting to cross U. S. highway 91 from 
the west. ( T. 14, 15). The testimony is conflicting 
as to whether at the time of the collission, the sema-
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phore showed amber or red for north and south-
bound traffic on U. S. Highway 91 and green for 
east and westbound traffic on Cudahy Lane. 
(T. 15). However, there is also testimony that the 
activated 'time device which controlled 'the semaphore 
had not been working properly prior to the acci-
dent. ( T. 133, 144). 
State's witness, Lester A. Blackner, testified 
that, following the accident, he noticed "tha1t the 
smell of alcohol was on his (defendant's) breath," 
and that he "felt" that defendant was intoxicated 
(T. 35, 36). However, Beth Jackson, a passenger in 
the 1950 Dodge automobile driven by her husband, 
who observed defendant while she was seated in a 
police officer's automobile with him, said that, al-
though she detected a smell of alcohol coming from 
the front seat, where Mr. Nelson was seated, (T. 58), 
she was unable to determine whether the defendant 
was intoxica:ted. (T. 58). Similarly, Mr. William 
Jackson expressed no opinion as to Mr. Nelson's 
alleged intoxication; and in fact, testified that, in 
his conversations with him, he experienced no diffi-
culty in understanding the defendant and that his 
words were clear. ( T. 65) . 
Mr. Kent Francis, a chemist for the State of 
Utah, testified of his receiving and testing a urine 
samp'le which was taken from the defendant. The 
urinalysis conducted for the purpose of determining 
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the amount of alcohol in the urine, was the subject 
of detailed examination. (T. 67, 68, & 69). The an-
alysis showed that the urine sample contained .259 
per cent ethyl alcohol. Through the use of a mathe-
matical equation, Mr. Francis was permitted to 
testify, over defendant's objection, that the defen-
dant's blood contained .184 per cent ethyl alcohol. 
(T. 68, 69). Mr. Francis admitted under cross ex-
amination that there was considerable variance in 
the conclusions to be drawn from alcohol-urine an-
alyses, depending upon the specific gravity of the 
urine tested, the time, and amount of consumption. 
He did not profess to know or take these factors 
into consideration. (T. 71, 73-75). This witness did 
not profess 'to know or testify concerning the effect 
of the determined amount, or of any amount of 
blood alcohol upon the bodily functions of any per-
son or upon the defendant. 
Mr. Deveraux, a part-time ambulance driver, 
took Mr. James to the St. Mark's Hospital. While 
th~re, he witnessed a conversation be'tween Trooper 
Schmidt and Mr. Nelson. A portion of Mr. Dev-
ereaux's testimony follows: ( T. 80). 
"A. Trooper Schmidt asked if he would 
submit to a blood test, ·and he said that he 
didn't know enough about what this test would 
do to him, and he would just as soon not give 
it. 
Q. And then what? 
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A. And then the Trooper said, '- well, 
this man was quite concerned about Mr. 
James' condition, and he said, 'If he dies, 
what will this blood test do for me?' and 
Trooper Schmidt said, 'It may help you in 
court, and it may harm you.' He said, 'I 
wouldn't want to say.' And he said he had 
just as soon not submi't 'to 'the blood test if 
he didn't have to. 
Q. And then what? 
A. We just stood there for probably 30 
minutes and just listened to them back and 
forth while we were waiting for the car." 
Although Mr. Devereaux stated that he had 
smelled an alcoholic odor coming from the corner 
where the defendant was sitting and expressed his 
opinion that the defendant was under the influence 
of intoxicants, ( T. 81) he further explained on cross 
examination that defendant's conduct indicated 
symptoms of shock; and that, if he hadn't smelled 
alcohoil, he didn't know what his opinion would have 
been. 
Mr. Warren Haddenham, who drives an ambu-
lance for the South Davis Firemen's Association, 
indicated that he saw defendant at St. Mark's Hos-
pital. He testified concerning a conversation be-
tween Trooper Schmidt and Mr. Nelson regarding a 
blood-alcohol test. 
"A. And then the conversation went to 
Mr. Schmidt on this blood-alcohol test. 
Q. What did the defendant say? 
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A. He didn't know what he wanted. He 
wanted to know what the blood test was. He 
didn't quite u n d e r s t a n d what Trooper 
Schmidt meant by blood-alcohol test." (T. 87). 
Although this witness smelled alcohol on Mr. 
Nelson and believed him to be intoxicated, he too 
explained that many symptoms observable in defen-
dant were compatible with mild shock, and frankly 
admitted that his opinion would have been differ-
ent had it not been for the smell of alcohol. (T. 91). 
Deputy Marshall, C'leon W. Gwynn, of North 
Salt Lake City, assisted in the investigation of the 
accident and was called as a witness for the S1tate. 
He drove Mr. Nelson, in compa11y with others, to 
St. Mark's Hospital in Sal't Lake City, where Mr. 
James had been 'taken for emergency treatment. En-
route, he observed that defendant appeared sick; 
and when asked if he were sick, said that he felt 
like "he wan ted to vomit . . . all I want is air." 
(T. 105). 
The Depu'ty also witnessed a conversation be-
tween Trooper Schmidt, a portion of which follows: 
" ... and he asked the defendant if he 
would sign for a blood-alcoho'l test, and the 
defendant then refused, wondering what ef-
fect tha;t would have on him in case the per-
son would die .. Gary Schmidt had asked the 
defendant if he wouldn't just think 'this over. 
That it was for his own good." ( T. 106). 
The witness said that Mr. Nelson "did smell 
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of alcohol" ( T. 106) and, in his opinion, appeared 
intoxicated. 
Following the episode at the hospital, the wit-
ness, in company Wi1th the defendant, returned to 
the scene of the accident and then accompanied 
Marshal Reynolds with the defendant to the home 
of Judge E. S. Arbuckle. He testified that Judge 
Arbuckle questioned him concerning the amount he 
hadhadtodrink. (T.109). 
Town Marshal, Roy A. Reynolds, of North Salt 
Lake, arrived at 'the scene of the accident at approxi-
mately 7:55 P.M. and assisted in interviewing wit-
nesses at the scene of the accident. His interview 
with Mr. Nelson included questioning into his acti-
vities of the day and: 
'' ... I asked him how much he had had to drink.'' 
(T. 135). 
Following 'this conversation, Mr. Nelson was 
placed under arrest by Marshal Reynolds, and he 
was taken to the home of Justice of the Peace E. S. 
Arbuckle for the purpose of obtaini11g a commit-
ment. Of the conversation which passed at the time 
the defendant was at the Justice's home, the follow-
ing is pertinent: ( T. 136). 
" ... I explained to the Judge at that time 
wha't the trouble was, why the defendant was 
there. Then he proceeded to talk to the de-
fendant. He asked the defendant where he had 
been; he got no answer. He asked him how 
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much he had had to drink, and the defendant 
went in'to the same procedure of from two 
to five, he didn't know for sure. He broached 
the question of how long the defendant had 
been drinking - had been partaking is how 
he worded it, I believe . . . " 
The Marshal was asked whether he observed 
any odors "about the defendant." (T. 136). Here-
plied that there was an odor of alcohol. (T. 137). 
The Marshal then concluded that 'the defendant 
"was definitely drunk." (T. 139). On cross exam-
ination, however, the following was read from the 
transcript at the preliminary hearing. (T. 140). 
Mr. Palmer: 
"From th'is experience did you form an 
opinion as to the condi'tion tha't Mr. Nelson 
was in? 
"I learned ·a long time ago not 'to form 
opinions. 
Q. Did you form an opinion in this case 
as to whether or not he was under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor? 
A. I definitely knew that he had been 
drinking but I didn't form an opinion until 
I got a report from the State Chemist." 
"Q. Was that your testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, Officer Reynolds?" 
A. I believe you are right, yes.'' 
Marshal Reyndlds also testified that prior to 
the time of the accident, they had experienced diffi-
culty with the traffic light. (T. 143, 144). That 
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'the safety engineer from the State of Utah had 
come to make adjustments upon his suggestion. 
(T. 145). 
Officer Gary Schmidt of the Utah Highway 
Pa:trol, as previously indicated, accompanied the 
defendant and others to the hospital. The officer 
testified 1that he requested the defendant to submit 
to a blood test; but before the hospital technician 
would withdraw the blood, it was necessary to ob-
1tain the defendant's written consent. Mr. Nelson 
said that "he did no't want Ito sign it." (T. 167). 
During this time, defendant repeatedly expressed 
concern for the condition of Mr. James. Mter again 
requesting defendant to submit to a blood teSt, 
the following conversation occurred: 
''. . . I did explain to him that if he re-
fused this blood test, that he could 'lose his 
driver's license. 
Q. Did he give you a blood test? 
A. No. About four times during the 
course of the time that we were there, I 
asked him for the blood test, and he refused all 
four times. 
test? 
Q. Did you give him any other kind of 
A. Yes, I secured a urine sample. 
Q. Tell us how you got 'that. 
A. About immediately after the last-
the third refusal, I went otlt to my car and 
secured a bottle from the trunk of my car 
10 
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that 'Ye used for that purpose, and brought it 
back In, and I asked Mr. Nelson, 'if you don't 
want to give us a blood sample, wil'l you give 
us a urine sample?' And he readily agreed 
t •t " 0 1 • • • 
The Officer testified that he smelled an odor 
of alcohol about the defendant, and based on this 
and his other observations, in his opinion, the defen-
dant was intoxicated. (T. 173). 
Judge E. S. Arbuckle, the Jus'tice of the Peace 
of North Salt Lake was produced by the State as 
a witness. A part of the conversation which he had 
with the defendant in his home is as follows: 
(T. 180). 
". . . and he sat down, and Royal (Mar-
shal Reynolds) told me he had charged him 
with drunk driving, and I talked to him -
Mr. Nelson- and I asked him if he had been 
drinking, and he said, 'Yes.' And I asked him 
how much, and he said 'two beers, a vodka, 
and some whiskey. And then I talked to him 
a minute or two and asked him why he was 
driving - why was he trying to run a red 
light, and I just said to him, 'how many did 
you say you had?' and he said, 'I had four 
beers, and two or 'three vodkas,' tha;t time. 
And he was talking so you could hardly un-
derstan·d what he was saying. His speech 
was very thick tongued, and you couldn't 
hardly understand what he said. And we talk-
ed there a while, and we decided that we had 
better lock him up for the night until he so-
bered up, and 'then bring him back so that 
he could 'talk so that we could understand 
whal he said and he could understand us." 
11 
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(T. 181). 
Glen Townsend indicated that he arrived at 
the scene of the accident shortly after it had occurred 
and observed that the defendant was "white." "He 
looked 1like he might be in shock from the ,accident." 
( T. 190). He did not notice anything unusual con-
cerning his walk. ( T. 190) . 
Similarly, Rosemary Hendrickson, had seen de-
fendant immediately before the accident, and in 
fact had followed him from 4500 South State Street 
in Salt Lake Ci'ty, to St. Mark's Hospital. (T. 192). 
She noticed nothing erratic or unusual about the 
way he drove. She talked to Mr. Nelson in the Sher-
iff's car, following the accident, and indicated that 
the defendant didn't have much to say, and observed 
ti1at he appeared "pretty worried ... a11d scared." 
(T. 194). 
Jay Hendrickson testified of his casual ac-
quaintanceship with Mr. Nelson and indicated that 
on the day on which the accident occurred, they 
drank about three glasses of beer together between 
approximately 11:00 o'clock in the morning and 
3:30 or 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. (T. 197). 
Following this, the defendant accomp,anied the wit-
ness to his home, where they each drank a vodka 
mixed with orange juice. The witness prepared the 
drink and indicated that he had put about an ounce 
of vodka in each glass of orange juice. (T. 199). 
12 
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A large dinner was then eaten by Mr. Nelson and 
Mr. Hendrickson, and neither had drunk more al-
coholic beverage. Mr. Nelson left his home a't 7:15 
P.M., and at that time Mr. Nelson was not intoxi-
cated. (T. 199). He explained that Mr. Nelson's 
"slow 'Oakie' walk" was normal, as was his speech. 
(T. 201). 
Mrs. Joan Nelson, wife of the defendant, was 
following the defendant in Mrs. Hendrickson's auto-
mobile and had followed him from approximately 
4500 South State Street in Salt Lake City to St. 
Mark's Hospital, where a traffic light separated 
them. She next found her husband sitting in a police 
car following the accident. She observed the he was 
"nervous and upset" (T. 210) but was not under the 
influence of alcohol. (T. 211). 
The defendant, Paul Nelson, stated that abou't 
noon he went to a lounge in Sa'lt Lake City with Jay 
Hendrickson and Ted Connors, where "he had about 
three beers". ( T. 219) . They then went to Mr. 
Hendrickson's house, where he had a drink of vodl<'a 
and orange juice. He spent approximately 3lj2 to 
4 hours at Mr. Hendrickson's home, where he ate 
a large meal and then proceeded to Bountiful. (T. 
220, 221). At this time he did not feel the effect of 
the beer or the vodka and orange that he had drunk 
earlier in the day. 
As a result of the accident, he suffered a bruis-
13 
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ed and lacerated knee and a· bump.on his head when 
he struck his chin on the steering wheel. (T. 225). 
The defendant denied that he had told the officers 
or Justice· of.lhe Peace E. S. Arbuckle that he had 
drunk whiskey earlier in the day. (T. 229). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
Defendant requested 'the Court to give the fol-
lowing instruction, identified as Defendant's Re-
quested Instruction No. 8: 
"To warrant you in convicting 'the de-
fendant, the evidence must to your minds ex-
clude every reasonable hypothesis dther than 
that of the guilt of the defendant; that is to 
say, if after a fu'll consideration in compari-
son of all the evidence in the case, you can 
reasonably explain the facts given in evidence 
on any reasonable ground other than that of 
the guilt of the defendant, you must acquit 
him." 
The Statute under which the defendant was 
charged reads as follows - Utah Code Annotated, 
76-30-7.4 ( 1953) : 
"Any person, while under the influence 
of intoxica'ting liquor ... to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving a ve-
hicle, who causes the death of another by op-
erating or driving any automobile ... in a 
reckless, negligent, or care'less manner, or 
14 
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'Yith a wanton or reckless disregard of humah 
life or safety, shall be. deemed guilty of a 
felony; and upon conviction shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the S'tate ·Penitentiary 
for a period of ndt less than one. nor more 
than ten years.'' 
The difference between this Statute, the viola> 
tion of which constitutes a felony, and Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-43.10, (1953) dealing with negli-
gent homicide, which is a misdemeanor, is that the 
person causing the death is intoxicated. Intoxication 
while driving is the element which takes the con-
duct of reckless'ly driving an automobile out of the 
misdemeanor classification and makes it a felony. 
It becomes extremely important, therefore, to ex-
amine with great care the testimony upon which 
the defendant was convicted as pertains to his al-
leged intoxication. 
The defendant was admitedly involved in a 
serious accident of considerable proportions. Exten-
sive dam'age was done to three automobiles; defen-
dant was shaken up considerably as a result of a 
knee and head blow ; and deceased, Floyd James, 
received mortat wounds. Although the defendant in-
dica'ted, immediately folllowing the accident, 'that 
he did not think he was hurt, it is submitted that 
he was not in a position at that time to make such 
an appraisal. It is not difficult to understand that, 
as some witnesses testified, the defendant was 
15 
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"white" and appeared "upset and scared." He was 
worried about the condition of Mr. James, as well 
as the possible consequences to himself, which in-
volved :the possible loss of his j'ob, and, of course, 
the possible legal consequences of the acciden't. ( T. 
225) . The only evidence of intoxication was based 
upon the various witnesses' opinions; and in each 
such case, an important element of their considera-
tibn was the smell of a1cohol present. Several wit-
nesses, including some of the State's witnesses, did 
not believe the defendant was intoxicated; and some 
expressly stated that, although they believed him 
to be intoxicated, their opinion would have been 
different had the smell of alcohol not been present. 
It has previously been established by 'this Court 
in the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Com-
pany v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P. 2d 277, 
( 1957), that the smell of alcohol is not sufficient 
upon which to sustain a finding of intoxication. 
In that case the defendant was found 'lying on the 
seat of his car, on which was also an empty bottle, 
and he smelled of 'liquor. The Deputy Sheriff ob-
served 'the defendant's eyes to be "rolling," his 
speech incoherent, and that he was "kind of throw-
ing his body around.'' 
The Court determined th'at: 
" ... the fact that there was an empty 
bottle in the car and 'the smell of liquor are 
16 
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not sufficient to suport a finding of intoxi-
catibn." . 
The Court has previously adopted the rule of 
law under circumstances such as those present in 
this case, where the S'tate relies upon circumstantial 
evidence, that the trial court, in order to avoid or 
minimize the danger of permitting the jury to specu-
late upon such evidence, must give a cautionary in-
struc'tion such as was requested by this defendant. 
In the case of State v. Burch, 100 Ut. 414, 115 
P. 2d 911 (Utah, 1941) the Court stated, page 912: 
"If circumstantia'l evidence is submitted 
to a jury, it is accompanied by an instruction 
that to convict upon such evidence, tha't evi-
dence must exclude every reasonable hypo-
thesis of innocence. That such ·an instruction 
is given implies that there is a question for 
the jury to decide as to whether or not such 
evidence does exclude that hypothesis. But, if 
the evidence is such that reasonable men would 
n'ot differ upon the fact that it includes such 
an hypothesis, then it is not a question for 
the jury, but is one for the Court." 
This rule was followed in the case of State v. 
Anderson, 66 Ut. 573, 158 P. 2d 127 ( 1945). See 
also the case of State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 
P. 2d 285, 302, where ihe Court in discussing the 
question of sufficien·cy of evidence in a conviction 
on circumstantial evidence said: 
"In order to sustain a conviction, the evi-
dence must be of such persuasive force that 
the mind migllt be reasonably satisfied of all 
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the necessary facts constituting the defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and 
where the proof of a necessary fact is depen-
dent solely upon circumstantial evidence, such 
circumstances must be such as to reasonably 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other 
'than the existence of such fact and be 
consistent with its existence and incon-
sistent with its nonexistence. It is not ne-
cessary that each circumstance in itself estab-
lish the guiit of the defendant, but the whole 
chain of circumstances, taken together, must 
produce the required proof." 
The wisdom of this rule, as it should have been 
app'lied in the case at bar, is apparent. The sole 
evidence concerning the intoxicated condition of the 
defendant was based on circumstantial evidence, 
consisting primarily of the smell of alcohol coming 
from the presence of the defendant, and observa-
tions of his demeanor. 
Reviewing the testimony in a light most favor-
able to the State, the evidence of intoxication is 
conflicting. Testimony from witnesses of both the 
State and the defendant indicated that he was not 
under the influence of intoxicants. Mr. Nelson's con-
duct following the accident was shown to be con-
sistent with symptoms of shock. Certainly the evi-
dence on this crucial point was not so conclusive 
as to exclude every "reasonable hypothesis of inno-
cence.'' 
Considerable time was spent at the trial with the 
testimony of Mr. Francis, the State Chemist, who 
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had analyzed a urine sample taken from the defen-
dant. The nature and effect of this testimony will 
be separate~y treated in another section of this Brief. 
But even considering his testimony most favorably 
for the S'tate, there was no evidence tending to shlow 
the effect that any amount of alcohol would have 
upon the defendant. This important consideration 
was left to the unbridled speculation of the jury. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the de-
fendant's conduct folllowing the accident was just 
as consistent wi'th defendant's innocence as with his 
guilt. Where the Sta'te based :the strength of 'the 
case upon the intoxicated condi'tion of the defendant, 
the evidence of which was wholly circumstantial, the 
failure of the Court to give the requested cautionary 
instruction consti'tuted reversible error. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PALPABLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO CHARGE THE JURY TO 
DISREGARD THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY OF H. KENT 
FRANCIS, STATE CHEMIST, WHIOH FAILURE CON-
STITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
As observed above, the State was required to 
prove the defendant's intoxication as an essential 
element of its case. In an a'ttemp't to sustain this 
burden, the State eal'led as a witness H. Kent Fran-
cis\ a chemist for the State of Utah, who had con-
ducted an analysis of a sample of urine taken from 
the defendant. His analysis in the sample of urine 
resulted in determining that there was .259 7o 
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ethyl alcohdl in the s a m p l e of urine tested 
(T. 68,) and that by multip_lying said figure 
by .72 he arrived at the figure of .184 per cent 
blood-alcohol. (T. 69). Over the objeetion of the de-
fen·dant, he testified concerning the content of al-
cohol in the blood based upon a determination of the 
alcohol content in the urine at various periods of 
time following consumption. ( T. 71). He in'dicated 
that 'there could be a vari'ance in resu1ts of the urin-
alysis te8t, depending upon whether the urine tested 
had an average specific gravity, light or heavy. 
( T. 72) . These factors were not taken into consider-
ation in making tests of defendant's urine sample. 
Further, Mr. Francis' test did not take into account 
the lapse of time between consumption and time the 
sample was taken. He admitted this to be an impor-
tant factor which could vary the result of the test, 
because following absorption the alcohol in the urine 
is greater than a blood 'alcohol ·content by approxi-
mately one-four'th. (T. 73). The chemist was per-
mitted to testify concerning the relationship between 
urine alcohol and blood alcohol generally without 
the benefit of knowing the amount of alcohol alleged-
ly consumed by the defendant nor the time in which 
it was consumed. Apparently these factors did not 
seem 'important either to the chemist or to the State, 
although admittedly they would h.ave a bearing upon 
the result of the test. 
No witness professed to know or state the ef-
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feet which any amount of alcohol found in the body 
fluids of the defendant would have upon his ability 
to drive 'an automobile. 
The District Attorney admitted 'that 
" ... there was no testimony as to 'the 
effect upon defendant of the blood alcohol or 
alcohol within his urine ... " (T. 259). 
The Coutt gave a requested instruction of de-
fendant as follows: 
''You are instructed that, though there 
is evidence regarding the results of a chemical 
test to the defendant's bodily fluids; to wi't, 
urine, if 'there is n·o evidence of the effeet of 
that percentage or any other percentage of 
alcohol in the bl'ood by weight upon the human 
being, you must disregard the results of the 
chemical test which has been received in evi-
dence." 
rt is submitted that 'this instruction did not 
correct the error which was committed in permitting 
the State to introduce c'onsiderable evidence con-
cerning tests for alcnholic content of defendant's 
bodi'ly fluids without testimony showing the effect 
of such alleged amounts of alcohol in the blood of 
the defendant or of any human being. The jury was 
permitted to speculate upon this vital issue when it 
was admitted by the State that such effect "had 
not been shown''. 
In this connection, this Court, in the case of 
State v. Cobo, Utah, 90 Ut. 89,60 P. 2d 952, (1936), 
discussed the recognized rule that errors with re-
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ference to instructions will not be considered on 
appeal unless sufficient exceptions were taken at 
trial. A recognized exception to that general rule 
exists, however, in "serious" cases when pa'lpable 
error on the face of a record occurs which invo~ves 
violation of fundamental rights and privileges and 
results in manifest prejudice. In such cases the 
Supreme Court can, even on its own cognizance, 
correct 'the same. 
"But in capital cases and in cases of 
grave and serious charg·ed offenses and con-
victions of long terms of imprisonment, cases 
involving the life and liberty of the citizen, 
we think that when palpable error is made to 
appear on the face of the record to the mani-
fest prejudicl of the accused, the Court has 
the power to notice such error and to correct 
the same, though no formal exception was 
taken to the ruling. In these days of wide-
spread advocacy of reform to procedure in 
criminal cases to heal and cure misgivings 
and faulty prosecutions, the safeguards of 
the righ'ts and privileges of the accused shou'ld 
not be overlooked and a loose reign held for 
the prosecution and a tight, technical, and 
restricted reign held on the accused." 
The prejudicial nature of the error is enhanced 
when viewed in the light of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A. 
( 1953, Pocket Supp.). The statute states in part: 
"If there was at the time 0.05 per cent 
or less by weight of alcohol in defendant's 
blood, it shall be presumed that defendant 
was not under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. 
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'' ( 2) If there was a't the time in excess 
of 0.05 per cent, but less than 0.15 per cent by 
weigh't of alcohol in defendant's blood, such 
facts shall not give rise to any presumption 
that defendant was or was not under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact 
may be considered with other competent evi-
dence in determining the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
"(3) If there was at the time 0.15 per 
cent or more by weight of alcohol in the de-
fendant's blood, it should be presumed that 
defendant was under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquors .. " 
The Court completely failed to give an instruc-
tion advising the jury of these presumptions. In view 
of the uncertain and prejudicial testimony which 
Mr. Francis was permitted to give concerning per 
cent of blood alcoho'l, the jury could have concluded 
that the defendant's blood alcohol fell below .015 
per cent level, or within that area where no per-
sumption of intoxication exists. 
The Court's failure to charge the jury that 
there was no evidence showing the effect of any 
amount of alcohol on any human being, or upon the 
defendant, when viewed in light of Section 41-6-44, 
U.C.A. (1953), was palpable error of which 'this 
Court can take judicial notice even though no formal 
exception was made to 'the same. 
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POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED IN VIOLA-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTIONS 7 & 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
As observed from 'the ear'lier recitation of facts, 
the defendant was placed under arrest by Marshal 
Reynolds following their return to the scene of the 
accident after having been to St. Mark's Hospital 
( T. 135). The · defendant was then taken to the 
home of the Justice of the Peace to 'talk to Judge 
Arbuckle', ( T. 135) , where Marshal Reynolds 
" ... explained to the judge ... what 'the 
trouble was, why the defendant was there. He 
asked him how much he had had to drink, and 
the defendant went into the same procedure 
of anywhere from two to five ... He broached 
the question of how long the defendant had 
been drinking . . . I wanted a commitment 
to lodge him (defendant) ih the Davis County 
Jail ... The judge issued the commitment." 
(T. 136). 
The record is completely devoid of any refer-
ence indicating that either Marshal Reyndlds or 
Justice of the Peace Arbuckle advised defendant of 
his constitutional right to remain silent. It is in-
teresting to observe that for approximately two 
hours, from 8 :00 P.M., when the accident occurred, 
until 10:00 P.M., when the defendant was taken 
before the Justice of the Peace, defendant had been 
in the presence of numerous police officers and a 
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magistra'te, and had not on one occasion been advised 
that his statements may be used against him, as 
ultimately proved to be the fact. 
Under 'the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
nlent to the United States Constitution, and Article 
I, Sees. 7 & 12 of the Constitution of Utah, an "ac-
cused shall not be compelled 'to give evidence agains1t 
himself''. These safeguards were completely ignored 
on this occasion by police officers and the magistrate 
insofar as this defendant was concerned. 
Further, Section 77-15-1, U.C.A. (1953) re-
quires that when "the defendant is brought before 
the magistrate upon an arrest . . . on a charge of 
having committed a pub1lic offense ... the magis-
trate must immediately inform him of the charge 
against him and of his right to 'the aid of counsel 
at every s'tage of th2 prcoeedings." 
Rather 'than follow the statutory mandates im-
posed upon him, the magistrate undertook, albeit 
under questioning, to extract admisions from de-
dendant as to his alleged drinking, and demanded 
explanations of asumed facts by asking hin1 "why 
he was driving - why was he tring to run a red 
Iigh't." ( T. 180). 
This Court underscored the necessity of law 
enforcement officers presrving these mandates in-
violate in the case of State v. Crank, 90 Ut. 89, 142 
P. 2d 178, 184 (1943), in the following language: 
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"Article I, Section 12 of the Sta'te Con-
stitution, declares that no personal shall. be 
compelled to give evidence against himself. 
This applies 'to statements exacted from h'im 
outside of Court as well as in Court.'' 
In the case of State v. Assenberg, 66 U't. 573, 
244 P. 1027 (1926), the Court found prejudicial 
error in admitting at 'trial statements of defendant 
made at an inquest before a Justice of the Peace and 
before a formal charge had been made against him. 
In granting a new trial, the Court stated: P. 1028: 
"He, (defendant) was not cautioned as 
to his right to answer questions nor his privi-
lege 'to refuse to testify. Neither was he cau-
tioned that any statement made by him at 'the 
time could or might be used against him in 
a subsequent prosecution." 
See also State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 
Pu 2d 723. 
The material extent to which defendant was 
prejudiced by the Justice of the Peace's failure to 
advise h'im of his rights becomes apparent when i't 
is realized that the Justice of the Peace appeared at 
the 'trial as a State's witness against the defendant. 
He appeared not as an impartial arbiter of rights 
between the State and defendant, but as an adverse 
witness, divulging admissions of defendant and re-
stating irrelevant accus·ations made by himself on 
the night of the fatal accident, at a time when defen-
dant remained in an upset and confused condition. 
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Instead of providing defendant with the shield of his 
constitutional rights, he used the occasion to probe 
him with questions, the answers to which he later 
used 'to assist in convicting him. 
While defendant was at St. Mark's Hospital, 
he was requested by Officer Schmidt on four differ-
ent occasions to submit 'to a blood 'test. The record 
indicates that the defendant did not understand 'the 
nature or ramifications of 'the test ( T. 80, 87). 
The Trooper's only explanation was, "It may help 
you in court and it may harm you ... I wouldn't 
want to say.'' On another occasion, a'lthough the 
conversation between 'the Trooper and defendant 
concerning the proposed blood 'test lasted for at leas't 
thirty minutes (T. 80),and later a conversation was 
had concerning a urine test, 'the defendant was not 
once informed 'that he had a right to refuse to sub-
mit to either or any test. He was not advised that 
'the tests would be used against him if the analysis 
proved to be to 'the advantage of the State, but was 
told "it was for his own goo'd" ( T. 106). As a mat-
ter of fact, when defendant persistently refused to 
submit to a blood test, 'the Officer 'tol'd him, if he 
didn't go through with it, he could lose his driver's 
license. 
In the recent case of Ringwood v. State, 8 Ut. 
2d 287, 333 P. 2d 943 (1953), the State revoked 
the defendant's driver's license for refusing to sub-
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mit to a blood test in accordance with 'the provisions 
of Section 41-6-44, 10 U.C.A. (1953, Pocket.Supp.). 
The Court reinstated the defendant's license because 
the arresting police officer did not properly advise 
the defendant that he had the right to choose be-
tween a test "of his breath, or of his b'lood, or of 
his urine, or his saliva." The Court stated at Page 
289 (Utah Reporter) : 
"It is realized that after considerable 
discussion about the blood 'test, the matter of 
a urine test was also mentioned. Mr. Ring-
wood likewise refused. But the basic fact is 
that the officer confronted him with the choice 
that he must give his blood for the test, or 
his license would be revoked. This was not 
in accordance with the requirements of the 
statute and there was therefore no proper 
basis for revoking his license." 
It is aparent from a review of the record that 
defendant was not once during the entire proceed-
ings of the evening properly advised of his con-
stitutional rights. 
It is no answer to assert that since defendant 
submitted to the 'test, the question is moot. The offi-
cers had an obligation 'to advise defendant of his 
constiutional privileges and to accurately explain 
the law as it pertains to tests taken to determine 
alcoholic content of bodily fluids. The officers failed 
in both responsibilities, and the State should not 
now be heard to say that no prejudice resulted to 
defendant. The urine test which was taken pro-
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vided a vital part of the testimony concerning the 
alleged intoxicated condition of defendant. 
In enforcing the laws of 'the State, the police 
officers cannot ignore the rights and privileges of 
i'ts citizens to their material prejudice and damage. 
The failure of the police officers and the Jus-
tice of the Peace to advise 1the defendant concerning 
his constitutional rights, including his right to re-
main silent, resulted in substantial prejudice to de-
fendant. The defendant made incriminating state-
ments which were subsequently used against him 
and deprived him of due process of llaw in violation 
of United States and State Constiutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The errors committed by the Trial Court in 
the conduct of the case constituted reversible error. 
Further, Mr. Nelson was convicled without due 
process of law inviolation of both 'the Federal and 
State Constitutions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
& 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
~4ttorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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